p~(l -p)"-~W e wish to compute the probability of system failure for n inputs. System failure occurs for all S'n >0. Thus, P,y,(n) P.g.,k = P( (El,~A E2jk) or (El,k A Es)k) or
Using the additive law of probability, this can be written as:
If independence of the versions is assumed, this can be rewritten a3:
The reason why independence is usually assumed is ob- 
Using the identity P(AAB) = P(A)P(B) + [P(AAB) -P(A) P(B)], this can be rewritten as: Clearly, if P,y$ <10 'g then P(Ei AEj) < 10-9. In other words, in order for P~v$ to be in the ultrareliable region,
73pKT is a first-order approximation to the probability y that the system fails whenever any one of the 3 versions fail. the interaction terms (i.e. P(Ei A Ej )) must also be in the ultrareliable region.
To establish that the system is ultrareliable, the validation must either demonstrate that these terms are very small or establish that P,y, is small by some other means (from which we could indirectly deduce that these terms are small.) Thus, we are back to the original life-testing problem again.
@rem the above discussion, it is tempting to conclude that it is necessary to demonstrate that each of the interaction terms is very small in order to establish that P,y, is very small. However, this is not a legitimate argument. Although the interaction terms will always be small when $'$y~is small, one cannot argue that the only way of establishing that P$Y3 is small is by showing that the interaction terms are small. However, the likelihood of establishing that P,ys is very small without directly establishing that all of the interaction terms are small appears to be extremely remote. This follows from the observation that without further assumptions, there is little more that can be done with equation (7). It seems inescapable that no matter how (7) is manipulated, the terms P(EiAEj) will enter in linearly. Unless, a form can be found where these terms are eliminated altogether or appear in a non-linear form where they become negligible (e.g. all multiplied by other parameters), the need to estimate them directly will remain.
Furthermore, the information contained in these terms must appear somewhere. The dependency of P,y, on some formulation of interaction cannot be eliminated.
Although the possibility that a method may be discovered for the validation of software fault-tolerance remains, it is prudent to recognize where this opportunity lies. It does not lie in the realm of controlled experiment ation. The only hope is that a reformulation of equation (7) can be discovered that enables the estimation of P$g$ from a set of parameters which can be estimated using moderate amounts oft esting. The efficacy of such a reformulation could be assessed analytically before any experimentation.
Danger of extrapolation to the ultrareliability region
To see the danger in extrapolating from a feasible amount of testing that the different versions are independent, we will consider some possible scenarios for coincident failure processes. Suppose that the probability of failure of a single version during a 1 hour interval is 10-5. If the versions fail independently, then the probability of a coincident error is on the order of 10-1°.
However, suppose in actuality the arrival rate of a coincident error is 10-7/hOZJr. One could test for 100 years and most likely not see a coincident error. From such experiments it would be tempting to conclude that the different versions are independent.
After all, we have tested the system for 100 years and not seen even one coincident error! If we make the independence assumption, thesystem reliability is(l-3x10-10). But actually thesystem reliability is approximately(l-10-7).
Likewise, if the failure rate for a single version were lo-4/hour and the arrival rate of coincident errors were 10-5/hour, testing for one year would most likely result in no coincident errors. The erroneous assumption of independence would allow the assignment of a 3 x 10-8 probability of failure to the system when in reality the system is no better than 10-5.
In conclusion, if independence cannot be assumed, it seems inescapable that the intersection of the events El, E2, and E3 (i.e. P(Ei A Ej )) must be directly measured. As shown above, these occur in the system failure formula not as products, but alone, and thus must be less than 10-12 per input in order for the system probability of failure to be less than 10-9 at 1 hour. It is possible to construct elaborate probability models which fall into the first class. Unfortunately since they depend upon unmeasurable parameters, they are useless for the quantification of ultrareliability. The second case is the only realistic approach. 8 The independence model is an example of the second case. Models belonging to the second case must explicitly or im8The first case is included for completeness and because such models have been proposed in the past. plicitly express the interaction terms in equation (7) years in order to demonstrate the universal applicability of the functions. Thus, in either case, the situation appears to be hopeless-the development of a credible coincident error model which can be used to estimate system reliability within feasible amounts of time is not possible.
5.3
The
Coincident-Error Experiments
Experiments have been performed by several researchers to investigate the coincident error process. The first and perhaps most famous experiment was performed by Knight and Leveson [5] . In this experiment 27 versions of a program were produced and subjected to 1,000,000 input cases. The observed average failure rate per input was 0.0007. The major conclusion of the experiment was that the independence model was rejected at the 99% confidence level. The quantity of coincident errors was much greater than that predicted by the independence model. Experiments produced by other researchers have confirmed the Knight-Leveson conclusion (15, 16] . A excellent discussion of the experimental results is given in [6] .
Some debate [6] has occurred over the credibility of these experiments.
Rather than describe the details of this debate, we would prefer to make a few general ob-servations about the scope and limitations of such experiments. First, the N-version systems used in these experiments must have reliabilities in the low to moderate reliability region. Otherwise, no data would be obtained which would be relevant to the independence question.g It is not sufficient (to get data) that the individual versions are in this reliability region. The coincident error rate must be observable, so the reliability of "voted" outputs must be in the low to moderate reliability region. To see this consider the following.
Suppose that we have a 3-version system where each replicate's failure rate is 10-4/hour. If they fail independently, the coincident error rate should be 3 x 10-8/hour. The versions are in the moderate reliability region, but the system is potentially (i,e. if independent) in the ultrareliable region. In order to test for independence, "coincident" errors must be observed. If the experiment is performed for one year and no coincident errors are observed, then one can be confident that the coincident error rate (and consequently the system failure rate) is less than 1.14 x 10-4. If coincident errors are observed then the coincident error rate is probably even higher. If the coincident error rate is actually 10-7/hour, then the independence assumption is invalid, but one would have to test for over 1000 years in order to have a reasonable chance to observe them! Thus, future experiments will have one of the following results depending on the actual reliability of the test specimens:
1. demonstration that the independence assumption does not hold for the low reliability system.
demonstration that the independence assumption
does hold for systems for the low reliability system.
3. no coincident errors were seen but the test time was insufficient to demonstrate independence for the potentially ultrareliable system.
If the system under test is a low reliability system, the independence assumption may be contradicted or vindicated.
Either way, the results will not apply to ul- The alternative covers the case where the system fails to meet the reliability y requirement. The a error is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (i.e. producer's risk). The /3 error is the probability of accepting the null hypothesis when it is false (i.e. consumer's risk).
There are two basic experimental approaches- (1) testing with replacement and (2) testing without replacement.
In either case, one places n items on test.
The test is finished when r failures have been observed.
In the first case, when a device fails a new device is put on test in its place. In the second case, a failed device is not replaced. The tester chooses values of n and r to obtain the desired levels of the a and ,B errors. In general, the larger r and n are, the smaller the statistical testing errors are.
It is necessary to assume some distribution for the time-to-failure of the test specimen. For simplicity, we will assume that the distribution is exponential.11 The test then can be reduced to a test on exponential means, using the transformation:
The expected time on test can then be calculated as a function of r and n. The expected time on test, Dt, for the replacement case is:
where PO is the mean time to failure of the test specimen. .10 2 = .03
.10 1 % .25
The power of the test 1 -,6 changes drastically with changes in r. Clearly r must be at least 2 to have a reasonable value for the bet a error.
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